* denotes supervised student,  denotes equal contribution

In press


Stanley, M.L.*, Henne, P.*, Yang, B.W.*, & De Brigard, F. (2020). Resistance to position change, motivated reasoning, and polarization. Political Behavior: 42 (3), 891-913. [pdf] [link]

Parikh, N.*, LaBar, K.S., De Brigard, F. (2020) Phenomenology of counterfactual thinking is dampened in anxious individuals. Cognition and Emotion. 1-9. [pdf] [link]

De Brigard, F. (2020). The explanatory indispensibility of memory traces. The Harvard Review of Philosophy. [pdf] [link]

De Brigard, F., Gessell, B.S.*, Yang, B.W.*, Stewart, G.W.*, & Marsh, E.J. (2020). Remembering possible times: Memory for details of past, future, and counterfactual simulations. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice. [pdf] [link]

Faul, L.*, Jacques, P.L.S., DeRosa, J.T.*, Parikh, N.*, De Brigard, F. (2020). Differential contribution of anterior and posterior midline regions during mental simulation of counterfactual and perspective shifts in autobiographical memories. NeuroImage, 116843. [pdf] [link]

De Brigard, F., Langella, S., Stanley, M.L.*, Castel, A.D., & Giovanello, K.S. (2020). Age-related differences in recognition in associative memory. Aging, Neuropsychology and Cognition. 27(2): 289-301. [pdf] [link]

 Stanley, M.L.*, Bedrov, A.*, Cabeza, R., & De Brigard, F. (2020). The centrality of remembered moral and immoral actions in constructing personal identity. Memory. 28(2): 278-284. [pdf] [link]

Huang, S.*, Stanley, M.L.*, & De Brigard, F. (2020). The phenomenology of remembering our moral transgressions. Memory and Cognition, 1-10. [pdf] [link]

Gessell, B.S.*, Stanley, M.L.*, Geib, B. & De Brigard, F. (2020). Prediction and topological models in neuroscience. Calzavarini, F., & Viola, M. (Eds.). Neural Mechanisms: New challenges in the philosophy of neuroscience. Springer. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. (2019). Review of “Remembering From the Outside: Personal Memory and the Perspectival Mind”. (Oxford University Press. 2018). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 09/05. [pdf] [link]

De Brigard, F. & O’Neill, K.G. * (2019). Two challenges for a dual system approach to temporal cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 42:e247. [pdf] [link]

Stanley, M. L.*, De Brigard, F. (2019). Moral memories and the belief in the good self. Current Directions in Psychological Science. 28(4): 387-391. [pdf] [link]

Yin, S.*, O'Neill, K.*, Brady, T.F., & De Brigard, F. (2019). The effect of category learning on recognition memory: A signal detection theory analysis. Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. pp. 3165-3171. [pdf]

Henne, P.*, Bello, P., Khemlani, S., & De Brigard, F. (2019) Norms and the meaning of omissive enabling conditions. Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. pp. 1901-1907 [pdf]

De Brigard, F. (2019). Know-how, intellectualism, and memory systems. Philosophical Psychology. 32(5): 720-759. [pdf] [link]

Henne, P.*, Niemi, L., Pinillos, Á., De Brigard, F., & Knobe, J. (2019). A counterfactual explanation for the action effect in causal judgment. Cognition. 190: 157-164. [pdf] [link]

De Brigard, F., Hanna, E.*, St Jacques, P.L., & Schacter, D.L. (2019). How thinking about what could have been affects how we feel about what was. Cognition and Emotion. 33(4): 646-659 [pdf] [link]

Stanley, M.L.* Henne, P.*, & De Brigard, F. (2019). Remembering moral and immoral actions in constructing the self. Memory and Cognition. 47(3): 441-454 [pdf] [link]

Murray, S.*, Murray, E., Stewart, G.W.*, Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & De Brigard, F. (2019). Responsibility for forgetting. Philosophical Studies. 176(5): 1177-1201 [pdf] [link]

Henne, P.*, Semler, J., Chituc, V., De Brigard, F., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2019). Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and Furniture. Philosophia. 47: 121-139 [pdf] [link]

De Brigard, F, & Parikh, N.* (2019). Episodic Counterfactual Thinking. Current Directions in Psychological Science.

28(1): 59-66. [pdf] [link]

Stanley, M.L.*, Gessell, B.S.*, & De Brigard, F. (2019). Network modularity as a foundation for neural reuse. Philosophy of Science. 86(1): 23-46. [pdf] [link]


Gessell, B.S.* & De Brigard, F. (2018). The discontinuity of levels in cognitive science. Teorema. 37(3): 151-165. [pdf] [link

Stanley, M.L.*, Dougherty, A.M., Yang, B.W.*, Henne, P.*, & De Brigard, F. (2018). Reasons probably won’t change your mind: The role of reasons in revising moral decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 147(7): 962-987. [pdf[link]

Parikh, N.*, Ruzic, L.*, Stewart, G.W., Spreng, N.R., & De Brigard, F. (2018). What if? Neural activity underlying semantic and episodic counterfactual thinking. NeuroImage. 178: 332-345. [pdf] [link]

Stanley, M.L.*, Yang, B.W.*, & De Brigard, F., (2018). No evidence for unethical amnesia for imagined actions: A failed replication and extension. Memory and Cognition. 46(5): 787-795. [pdf] [link] 


De Freitas, J., Sarkissian, H., Newman, G.E., Grossman, I., De Brigard, F., Luco, A., & Knobe, J. (2018). Consistent Belief in a Good True Self in Misanthropes and Three Interdependent Cultures. Cognitive Science. 42(S1): 134-160. [pdf] [link]

De Brigard, F. (2018). Memory, Attention, and Joint Reminiscing. In: Debus, D., Michaelian, K., & Perrin, D. (Eds.) New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. Routledge Press. pp. 200-220. [pdf]

De Brigard, F. (2018). Memory and the Intentional Stance. In: Huebner, B. (Ed.) The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett. NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-91. (4) [pdf]

De Brigard, F (2018). Nostalgia and Mental Simulation. Gotlib, A. (Ed.) The Moral Psychology of Sadness. London: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 155-181. (5) [pdf]


De Brigard, F. & Gessell, B.S.* (2018). Why episodic memory may not be for communication. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 41. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. (2018) Memoria. Enciclopedia de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica. URL: [pdf]



De Brigard, F., Parikh, N.*, Stewart, G.W.*, Szpunar, K.K., & Schacter, D.L. (2017). Neural activity associated with repetitive simulation of episodic counterfactual thoughts. Neuropsychologia. 106: 123-132. [pdf] [link]

De Brigard, F. (2017). Memory and Imagination. In: Bernecker, S. & Michaelian, K. (Eds.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge Press. pp. 127-140. (6) [pdf]


De Brigard, F. (2017). Responsibility and the relevance of alternative future possibilities. Teoria. 37(2): 25-35. [pdf[link]


De Brigard, F. (2017). El problema de la conciencia para la filosofía de la mente y de la psiquiatria. Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofia. 66 (Supl. 3): 13-43. [pdf] [link]


Stanley, M.L.*, Henne, P.*, Iyengar, V., Sinnott-Armstrong, W. & De Brigard, F. (2017). I am not the person I used to be: The self and autobiographical memories of immoral actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 146(6): 884-895. [pdf[link]


Stanley, M.L.*, Stewart, G.W.*, & De Brigard, F. (2017). Counterfactual plausibility and comparative similarity. Cognitive Science. 41 (Supl.5): 1216-1228. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F.†, Rodriguez, D.C.†*, & Montañés, P. (2017). Exploring the experience of episodic past, future, and counterfactual thinking in younger and older adults: A study of a Colombian Sample. Consciousness and Cognition. 51: 258-267. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. (2017). Cognitive systems and the changing brain. Philosophical Explorations. 20(2): 224-241. [pdf[link]


Henne, P.*, Pinillos, A., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Cause by omission and norm: Not watering plants. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 95(2): 270-283. [pdf] [link]


Stanley, M.L.*, Parikh, N.*, Stewart, G.W.*, & De Brigard, F. (2017). Emotional intensity in autobiographical memory and counterfactual thinking. Consciousness and Cognition. 48: 283-291. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F., Brady, T.F., Ruzic, L.*, & Schacter, D.L. (2017). Tracking the emergence of memories: A category-learning paradigm to explore schema-driven recognition. Memory & Cognition. 45(1): 105-120. [pdf] [link]



De Brigard, F., Giovanello, K.S., Stewart, G.W.*, Lockrow, A.W., O’Brien, M.M., & Spreng, R.N. (2016). Characterizing the subjective experience of episodic past, future and counterfactual thinking in healthy young and older adults. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 69(12): 2358-2375. [pdf] [link]


Henne, P.*, Chituc, V., De Brigard, F., Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2016). An empirical refutation of “Ought” implies “Can”. Analysis. 76(3): 283-290. [pdf] [link]


Chituc, V., Henne, P.*, Sinnott-Armstrong, W. & De Brigard, F. (2016). Blame, Not Ability, Impacts Moral "Ought" Judgments for Impossible Actions: Toward an empirical refutation of "Ought" implies "Can". Cognition. 150: 20-25. [pdf] [link]

De Brigard, F. & Gessell, B.S.* (2016). Time is not of the essence: Understanding the neural correlates of mental time travel. In: Klein, S.B., Michaelian, K., & Szpunar, K.K. (Eds.) Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel. NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 153-180. (7) [pdf]


Stanley, M. L.* & De Brigard, F. (2016). Modularity in network neuroscience and neural reuse. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 39. [pdf[link]



De Brigard, F. (2015). Critical notice on Neil Levy’s “Consciousness and Moral Responsibility”. Analysis. 75(4): 661-667. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. & Hanna, E.* (2015). Clinical applications of counterfactual thinking during memory reactivation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 38: 22-23. [pdf[link]


De Brigard, F., Spreng, R.N., Mitchell, J.P., & Schacter, D.L. (2015). Neural activity associated with self, other, and object-based counterfactual thinking. NeuroImage. 109: 12-26. [pdf] [link]


Schacter, D.L., Benoit, R., De Brigard, F., & Szpunar, K.K. (2015). Episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking: Intersections between memory and decisions. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory. 117: 14-21. [pdf] [link]

De Brigard, F. (2015). What was I thinking? Dennett’s Content and Consciousness and the reality of propositional attitudes. In: Muñoz-Suárez, C.M. & De Brigard, F. (Eds.). Content and Consciousness Revisited. N.Y. Springer. pp. 49-71. (8) ​[pdf]

St. Jacques, P. & De Brigard, F. (2015). Neural correlates of autobiographical memory: Methodological Considerations. Addis, D., Barense, M., & Duarte, A. (Eds.). The Handbook on the Cognitive Neuroscience of Memory. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 265-286. [pdf]


De Brigard, F. (2015). Review of “Involuntary Autobiographical Memories.” Dorthe Berntsen. (Cambridge University Press. 2009). Memory Studies. 8(2): 255-259. [pdf] [link]


Arzi, A., Banerjee, S., Cox, J., De Brigard, F., Doll, B., D’Souza, D., Fairley, J., et al. (2014). The significance of cognitive neuroscience: Findings, applications and challenges. Gazzaniga, M. and Mangum, R. (Eds.) The Cognitive Neurosciences V. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 1071-1078. (10) [pdf]

De Brigard, F. (2014). In defense of the self-stultification objection. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 21 (5-6): 120-130. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. (2014). The nature of memory traces. Philosophy Compass. 9(6): 402-414. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. (2014). Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form episodic hypothetical thinking. Synthese. 191(2): 155-185. [pdf] [link]



De Brigard, F., Addis, D., Ford, J.H., Schacter, D.L., & Giovanello, K.S. (2013). Remembering what could have happened: Neural correlates of episodic counterfactual thinking. Neuropsychologia. 51(12): 2401-2414. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F., Szpunar, K.K., & Schacter, D.L. (2013). Coming to grips with the past: Effect of repeated simulation on the perceived plausibility of episodic counterfactual thoughts. Psychological Science. 24(7): 1329-1334. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. & Brady, W. (2013). The effect of what we think may happen on our judgments of responsibility. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 4 (2): 259-269. [pdf] [link] 

De Brigard, F., Giovanello, K.S., & Kaufer, D. (2013). Neuroanatomy of Memory. In: Arciniegas, D.B.; Anderson, C.A. & Filley, C.M. (Eds.) Behavioral Neurology and Neuropsychiatry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 161-173. (11) [pdf]


De Brigard, F. (2013). Review of “Attention is Cognitive Unison”. Christopher Mole. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Journal of Consciousness Studies. 20 (1-2): 239-247. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. & Giovanello, K.S. (2012) Influence of outcome valence in the subjective experience of episodic past, future and counterfactual thinking. Consciousness and Cognition. 21 (3): 1085-1096. [pdf] [link]


Giovanello, K.S., De Brigard, F., Ford, J.H., Kaufer, D., Burke, J., Browndyke, J., & Welsh-Bohmer, K. (2012). Event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging changes during relational retrieval in normal aging and amnestic mild cognitive impairment. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society. 18 (5): 886-897. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. (2012). Predictive memory and the surprising gap. Commentary on Andy Clark’s “Whatever Next? Predictive Brains, Situated Agents and the Future of Cognitive Science”. Frontiers in Psychology. 3:4 [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. (2011). The role of attention in conscious recollection. Frontiers in Psychology. 3: 29. [pdf] [link]

De Brigard, F. (2011). Memoria, neurociencia y educación. In: Lipina, S. & Sigman, M. (Eds.) La pizarra de Babel: Puentes entre neurociencia, psicología y educación. Libros del Zorzal, Buenos Aires. pp: 179-194.


De Brigard, F. (2010). Consciousness, Attention, and Commonsense. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 17 (9-10): 189-201. [pdf] [link]

Sarkissian, H., Chatterjee, A., De Brigard, F., Knobe, J., Nichols, S., & Sirker, S. (2010). Is Belief in Free-Will a Cultural Universal? Mind and Language. 25 (3): 346-358. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. (2010). If you like it, does it matter if it’s real? Philosophical Psychology. 23 (1): 43-57. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. & Prinz, J. (2010). Attention and Consciousness. WIREs Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science. 1 (1): 51-59. [pdf] [link]

2009 and earlier

De Brigard, F. (2009). Comentario crítico a “Las dificultades del compatibilismo de Dennett” de José Antonio Guerrero del Amo. Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofía. 58 (141): 262-268. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. (2009). Review of “The Origins of Meaning”. James R. Hurford. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2007). Philosophical Psychology. 22 (4): 531-535. [pdf]


De Brigard, F., Mandelbaum, E., & Ripley, D. (2009). Responsibility and the Brain Sciences. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

12 (5): 511-524. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. (2007). Review of “Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness”. Daniel C. Dennett. (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 2005). Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofía. 56 (134): 129-136. [pdf]


De Brigard, F. (2007). Review of “Furnishing the Mind. Concepts and their Perceptual Basis”. Jesse J. Prinz. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 2002. Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofía. 56 (133): 163-169. [pdf

De Brigard, F. (2006). Capas limítrofes y dominios de evidencia en ciencia cognitiva. Universitas Philosophica. 46: 53-77. [pdf]


De Brigard, F. (2006). Review of “La importancia de lo que nos preocupa”. Harry G. Frankfurt. (Katz Editores: Argentina, 2006, 274p. Original title: “The Importance of What We Care About”). Piédepágina. 9: 90.


De Brigard, F. (2005). Review of “La Naturaleza de la Experiencia. Sensaciones”. Maite Ezcurdia y Olbeth Hansberg (Comp.). (UNAM: México, 2003, 360p.). Piédepágina. 5: 79. 


De Brigard, F. (2004). El advenimiento de la metáfora mente-computador. Del alma al software 3. Revista Colombiana de Psiquiatría. 33 (1): 64-85. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. (2003). En busca de la mente cerebral. Del alma al software 2. Revista Colombiana de Psiquiatría. 32 (4): 373-390. [pdf] [link]


De Brigard, F. (2003). Eliminando el fantasma de la máquina. Del alma al software 1. Revista Colombiana de Psiquiatría.

32 (2): 175-1 [pdf[link]

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